A number of prominent U.S. scholars and politicians have argued that China’s divergence from liberal capitalism-marked by its authoritarian governance and state-driven economic model-will ultimately lead to its failure. This viewpoint, while varied in nuance, is rooted in a deep-seated belief in the superiority of Western-style liberal democracy and free-market capitalism as engines of sustained prosperity and innovation.
Gordon G. Chang, author of The Coming Collapse of China, is perhaps the most well-known exponent of this thesis. Chang contends that China’s authoritarian system and state-controlled economy are fundamentally unsustainable, citing persistent corruption, inefficiency, and lack of political freedoms as fatal flaws. He has repeatedly predicted the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), arguing that economic slowdowns and social unrest are symptoms of deeper systemic instability156. While his predictions have not materialized, Chang’s arguments continue to resonate in policy and media circles.
Political scientist Michael Beckley similarly asserts that China’s rise is stalling due to demographic decline, mounting debt, and the inefficiencies inherent in authoritarian rule. Beckley contrasts China’s rigid system with the adaptability of liberal democracies, claiming that the latter are better equipped to weather economic and social challenges over the long term.
The late economist Milton Friedman offered a theoretical foundation for this perspective, positing that sustained economic growth requires not just market reforms but also political liberalization. Friedman believed that China’s economic success would eventually necessitate greater political freedoms, and without them, the country’s progress would stall3. This view, rooted in modernization theory, has influenced generations of Western analysts.
On the political front, Marco Rubio has been a vocal critic of China’s state-led model, arguing that its lack of free markets and democratic institutions will ultimately limit innovation and global trust, leading to stagnation. Rubio’s stance reflects a broader bipartisan skepticism in Washington about the viability of China’s system, often framed in terms of national security and technological competition4.
Legal scholar Carl Minzner adds that China’s recent turn toward greater authoritarianism under Xi Jinping-marked by tighter political controls and a retreat from earlier economic reforms-will stifle dynamism and alienate global partners. Minzner sees this “anti-reform era” as a crucial misstep that could hasten decline.
Underlying these arguments is an ideological confidence in Western systems, often accompanied by selective engagement with China’s complexities. Critics focus on China’s setbacks-such as economic slowdowns, property crises, and demographic challenges-while downplaying its adaptability, technological advances, and the broad public support for its social contract. Some, like Chang, have faced criticism for repeatedly inaccurate predictions, yet their core argument persists: that China’s rejection of liberal capitalism is a fatal flaw.
In summary, these U.S. voices represent a spectrum of academic and political opinion united by the belief that China’s authoritarian, state-led model is unsustainable without liberal reforms. Their arguments are shaped by both ideological conviction and strategic rivalry, and while they highlight real vulnerabilities in China’s system, they often underestimate its resilience and capacity for adaptation.