David M. McCourt is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of California, Davis. He is working on a book tentatively titled The End of Engagement: America’s China and Russia Watchers and U.S. Strategy Since the Cold War.
In this article, McCourt opines that Washington is misrepresenting the contemporary China debate as Groupthink rather than Policy Capture. This distinction matters because it can lead to inappropriate solutions.
Groupthink refers to a psychological phenomenon in which a group of individuals strive for consensus or conformity within the group. In a groupthink scenario, the desire for harmony and unanimity can often override critical thinking, resulting in the suppression of dissenting opinions and alternative perspectives. On the other hand, Policy Capture refers to a situation where powerful individuals or interest groups exert undue influence on the policy-making process, leading to policies that primarily serve their own interests rather than the broader public interest.
McCourt says that it is incorrect to attribute Groupthink for the current paradigmatic shift on how Washington views Beijing – from potential partner to rival, and increasingly toward the de facto enemy. This paradigm shift can better be described as an exercise in “Policy Capture”. The U.S. foreign policy community’s coherence (Policy Capture) is the opposite of what America’s security experts (Groupthink), people such as Charlene Barshefsky (reinvigoration of engagement), and Patricia M. Kim (careful management) hope to achieve.
The notion that this shift toward a more hawkish approach constitutes bipartisan groupthink in Washington foreign policymaking ignores those China experts, think tankers, former diplomats, and business people who have raised concerns about this new direction. Pro-business voices, like former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, have questioned the logic of decoupling.
“Not all of America’s foreign policy elite is of the same mind on China—not just on the facts of the CCP’s actions and intentions but what Washington should do in response, what America’s interests are, and what policies best serve it. Many fear that competition has too easily slipped into confrontation, and that a return toward a managed form of great power competition would be wise. The administration should listen to other voices pushed aside, since these voices present different understandings of America’s interests, which remain firmly against conflict.”
Moreover, experts have voiced concern over whether the demise of engagement has left the United States with a dangerous lack of the bilateral connections with China needed for crisis management.